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Executive Security
82-2948

21 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM : Special Assistant to the Director for
Interdepartmental Affairs
SUBJECT : DDCI Presentation on Soviet C³I Warfighting

1. The Deputy Director commented that his presentation this morning seemed to go well. The reaction from the audience was that it was a sobering presentation.

2. He requests that it be retyped using a speech ball for possible future use. I will discuss the mechanics of this with [redacted] Attached for your information is a copy of the text as revised by the DDCI.

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3. You may recall that there is a requirement by the NSIA Symposium that all rapporteurs submit for publication at the Secret level their entire text or an abstract of that text. [redacted] people have prepared a one-page abstract which might be appropriate for submission. The DDCI requests that you consider releasing the entire text if you are not concerned about this message receiving broad distribution within the military-industrial complex. If you have any hesitation about releasing the entire text, he is prepared to go with the short abstract. Please let me know what your decision is.

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[redacted]

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cc: SA/DDCI
D/SOVA
EA/DDI

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Soviet Command and Control for Warfighting

The USSR has thought seriously about how to fight a modern war and ~~have~~^{has} made provisions to control ~~their~~^{its} forces in such a conflict. The nature and history of the Soviet Union's conservative political system stresses firm centralization of authority and control. Consequently, the Soviet political leadership places a heavy premium on centralized command and control of its military forces. Soviet confidence in their capabilities for global nuclear conflict will be significantly influenced by command and control considerations. This includes confidence in their own command and control continuity, and their prospects for disrupting and destroying the command and control systems of the US and its allies.

The Soviets are well trained in planning and executing initial operations when the details can be worked out in peacetime. Soviet central planning, however, may not be able to respond coherently if NATO and other opponents survive initial Soviet operations and centralized command is degraded. Soviet military planners in the future are likely ~~to be~~^{remain} concerned about command and control and will continue to emphasize its improvement.

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